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Rapid identification of the cause of failure is a high priority in the immediate aftermath 
of a major civil aircraft accident. Attention is often focused on the two recorders, the 
Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) and flight data recorder. In the event of sudden, 
catastrophic loss of an aircraft through explosions or structural failure decompressions, 
the recordings are seen as even more important. Yet these recorders are not designed to 
record such events with great fidelity and the ability of accident investigators to 
interpret such recordings has been severely tested in several major accidents in the past 
thirty years; comparisons between accident recordings have not been able to produce 
conclusive results. This paper reports on a programme investigating CVR recordings of 
explosions and rapid decompressions on a variety of aircraft from trials in several 
countries. In particular we show that CVR recordings are generally unable to 
discriminate between explosions and structural failure decompressions and we explain 
why this is so. We shall also put forward practical suggestions for systems that may be 
able to record these events with greater fidelity and which would provide investigators 




The AAIB report [1] on the Pan-Am Lockerbie accident in December 1998 identified a 
loud sound lasting 170ms on the cockpit area microphone (CAM) track at the end of the 
recording. The sound occurred while the crew were copying their transatlantic 
clearance from Shanwick ATC. A very large volume of forensic material arising out of 
Lockerbie indicated that detonation of an improvised explosive device led directly to 
the destruction of the aircraft.  While it is reasonably inferred that the 'loud sound' is 
related in some way to the detonation of the explosive device, the official report into the 
accident conceded "analysis of the flight recorders … did not reveal positive evidence of 
the explosion event."  Moreover a safety recommendation arising out of the 
investigation was that "a method should be devised of recording positive and negative 
pressure pulses, preferably utilising the aircraft's flight recorder systems." Since the 
publication of this report a study into the CVR/CAM response to explosions and 
structural failure rapid decompressions has taken place and has been reported widely 
to Working Groups, such as ISASI WG50, EUROCAE ED-56, at conferences [2, 3] and to 
an ISASI Seminar [4]. More recently a loud sound at the end of the TWA 800 recording 
was subject to detailed and meticulous analysis by the NTSB but did not reveal the 3
cause of the accident and was therefore of little diagnostic value. This aim of this paper 
is to explain why these recordings do not lead to useful forensic evidence and to 
consider what systems would be necessary to discriminate between explosions and 
structural failure decompressions and to locate the seat of the hull loss. 
 
CAM/CVR recordings of explosions 
 
Figure 1 (reproduced from reference [4]) shows the CVR and instrumentation 
signatures for an explosion event conducted on the ground in an ex-service BAe Trident 
aircraft. The plot shows the CAM channel of each of three tape-based CVR systems 
together with an accelerometer (vibration sensor) and a microphone (pressure sensor) 
installed close to the CAM for the trials. All sensors were in close proximity to each 
other in the cockpit and the explosion was approximately 9.4m aft of the sensor 
position. Time zero is the time of detonation of the explosive device – obviously this 
reference would not be available on an accident recording but is helpful here in the 
determination of the cause of epochs within the recording. 
 
Several features are striking about this figure. First, the three CAM signatures have 
some similar features but are certainly not identical. The features that they share 
include a response commencing before 0.01s with a low amplitude and low frequency 
range (the graph is fairly smooth). All of them change character at around 0.025s 
increasing in amplitude and frequency range (the graph becomes more spiky). 
Interestingly the vibration record is similar although the vibration response amplitude 
falls soon after 0.035s whereas the record for CVR system 1 remains at a high level until 
0.06s and high for the whole of the record for CVR 2, suggesting a possible saturation of 
the tape dynamic range. The pressure record differs from the others in that it only 
commences at 0.025s. 
 
Similar results have been obtained from very many trials with explosive devices at 
many locations on several aircraft and the following explanation of the records 
described above may be inferred. First the blast wave from the explosion source 
impinges on the structure and a shock wave is then transmitted through the structure at 
a speed of 4000 to 5000 m/s.  The CAM is sensitive to vibration and responds to the 
arrival of the structure-borne shock wave. Meanwhile the air-blast wave travels through 
the fuselage and eventually arrives in the cockpit. The speed of this wave is dependent 
upon the yield of the explosion but can be taken as the speed of sound in air of 340 m/s 
where distances are relatively large and yields are quite small. On arrival in the cockpit, 
the blast produces both a pressure response from the CAM but also produces further 
local vibration (as seen by the accelerometer) to which the CAM is also sensitive. The 
instrumentation microphone (bottom graph) responds only when the pressure wave 
arrives at the CAM and is designed to have very low vibration sensitivity. 4
Figure 1: CVR and instrumentation signatures for an explosive device 5
Vibration Sensitivity 
 
It is interesting that the CAM is quite sensitive to vibration. This phenomenon has been 
exploited in the past with helicopter gearbox investigations, yet the CAM is 
intentionally vibration isolated from the structure. The reason is simply that the 
vibration levels of a few 'g' are themselves quite high, not that the CAM or vibration 
isolation are poorly designed. 
 
The results of all these trials appeared to show that locating the seat of an explosion 
event should be rather straightforward. One simply took the difference in arrival times 
of the structure-borne and air-borne shock waves and computed distance from this 
difference using values for the two propagation velocities. Formulae for this were given 
in [4] taking into account the possible delay caused by the propagation of an air-blast 
wave across the fuselage for a device not attached to the outer skin, so providing lower 
and upper bounds for the distance from the cockpit to the seat of the explosion. 
 
However, accident recordings did not appear to show these two epochs with any 
distinction, so determination of axial location using direct application of this method 
was not possible. Moreover some trials with larger explosion yields also did not show 
the two epochs; the explosion response simply arrived and then decayed with time 
without distinct change in bandwidth or amplitude after the start. Analysis of the 
influence of explosion yield on the response components helps to explain why this is so.  
 
CVR output related to explosion yield 
 
Trials were conducted on a Boeing 747 aircraft using small yield explosions. The 
response was measured with five widely used commercial aircraft CVR systems 
including four tape-based systems and one solid-state recorder. For one series of firings 
the same source location was used each time but the mass of explosive was increased 
linearly from one unit to five units. The results, sets of time series, resembled the time 
series given in figure 1 so are not reproduced here. Instead, in figure 2, we show the 
peak-to-peak values for the two components in each of the recordings. Suppose we 
denote the time of arrival of the structure borne wave by t1 and the time of arrival of the 
air-borne wave by t2. Figure 2 shows the CVR/CAM response amplitude for t1<t<t2, 
i.e. the response due exclusively to the structure-borne shock. The figure shows that an 
increase in yield generally produces a greater CVR/CAM output.  
 
Figure 3 shows the results for t>t2, i.e. the response after the arrival of the airborne blast 
wave including both sound and vibration. We observe that the amplitude of this 
response is not only greater than for the phase t1<t<t2 but is independent of the 
explosion yield. This implies that the physical parameter variation is greater than the 6
dynamic range of the recorder or that the sensors are overloaded and that the recording 
is saturated and probably highly distorted. 
 
Figure 2: Variation in CVR output with explosion yield 
for t1<t<t2 for five different CVR/CAM systems. 
Each symbol represents one CVR type 
 
Figure 3: Variation in CVR output with explosion yield 












































Figure 4 shows a CAM time history for a high-yield explosion on a pressurised Boeing 
727 aircraft. The charge was approximately 8.1m aft of the cockpit; the explosion 
ruptured the skin of the aircraft. Clearly the CAM does not show a transition at t2. The 
time taken for sound to travel from the seat of the explosion to the cockpit is 
approximately 0.024s and the response clearly begins significantly before this. We infer 
that the response begins ostensibly at t1 but the magnitude already exceeds the 
dynamic range of the CAM/CVR so no change in signal magnitude is visible at t2.  The 
record is therefore unable to show the axial location of the charge as was the case for 
smaller, non-destructive tests. 
 
Figure 4: CAM time history for a high yield explosion 
on a Boeing 727 aircraft. 
 
The yields of all the explosions analysed in figures 2 and 3 are below the yield that 
might be expected from a terrorist device. If results from increased yield were 
produced, the response for t1<t<t2 for all recorder types would exceed the dynamic 
range and the recordings would be saturated as was the case in figure 4. There would 
then be no discrimination between the two phases of the response recording and the 8
section for t>t2 would be indistinguishable from t<t2. It is therefore not possible to use 
the method described above to locate the source for accident recordings. 
 
One extensive study [5-8] has attempted to locate the seat of an explosion using the 
spectrogram of the CVR recording. The basis of the method is that the structural shock 
transmission is dispersive, i.e. different frequencies propagate at different velocities. 
However, the nature of the explosion source and complex multiple transmission paths 
severely limit the applicability of the theoretical basis. Operationally, the method 
required placement of a series of curves on an accident recording spectrogram with the 
intention that their curvature would indicate distance from the source to the CAM. 
Investigators found this aspect particularly problematic as several sets of curves could 
be drawn on any given spectrogram leading to ambiguous results. In one part of the 
study, spectrograms of several accidents were analysed in a blind test but were not able 
to confirm the validity of the approach. A recommendation arising from a review [9] at 
the end of the study was that the method should not be used in accident investigation. 
 
The interval t1<t<t2 is due to structure-borne vibration which is likely to be produced at 
very high levels under both structural failure and explosion-generated conditions. In 
the case of an explosion, t2 is the arrival time of the blast wave at the CAM and in the 
case of a structural failure t2 is the arrival of the decompression wave at the CAM. 
Decompression waves travel at the speed of sound as with blast waves but are 
obviously of opposite polarity. Their propagation velocity and arrival at the CAM has 
been observed in various decompression trials. For both explosions and 
decompressions the CVR records are not high fidelity recordings of vibration as (i) the 
CAM is not designed as a vibration sensor but merely exhibits vibration sensitivity 
(which may be frequency dependent, non-linear and directionally dependent) and 
(ii) because the limited dynamic range of the recording medium and sensor are both 
(considerably) exceeded. Thus, the CVR/CAM combination is unable to locate the 
source of a decompression and seems to be unable to discriminate between explosions 
and structural failure decompressions. 
 
Other transducers to detect explosions/structural failure decompressions 
 
Among the instrumentation deployed in some trials were arrays of pressure 
transducers. These are effectively very low sensitivity microphones with corresponding 
low vibration sensitivity. Figure 5 shows the output of two transducers placed on either 
side (axially) of an explosion in a pressurised fuselage. Several features in these time 
histories are noteworthy. First both records commence with a pressure rise. The 
magnitude of an air-blast pressure rise is a function of explosion yield and distance 
from the charge and is widely tabulated [10,11]. The pressure rises occur at different 
times because the transducers are at different distances from the explosion source.  The 
transducer closest to the charge shows the earliest and greatest pressure rise. The time 9
delay between the two pressure rises can be used to determine the axial location of the 
device to within 0.5m. Secondly, both transducers show a pressure fall to a value 
significantly below the original ambient conditions. This is due to the breach of the 
pressurised fuselage. The rate of depressurisation indicates the size of the hole through 
which cabin pressure is venting. The precise form of the pressure curve (a series of 
pressure drops between short periods of relatively constant pressure producing a step-
like appearance) has been explained by reference to one-dimensional flow models [2].  
 
Interpretation of the results in figure 5 indicates that recordings of pressure from either 
side of an event appear to offer everything the investigator would seek namely: 
 
• the location of the source (from the difference in arrival times) 
• the presence of any explosion (indicated by an initial pressure rise) 
• any decompression (indicated by a pressure fall) 
 
Figure 5: Recordings from pressure transducers placed on either 
side of an explosion in a pressurised fuselage. 
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Although this single result suggests that pressure transducer based systems may be 
widely applicable, trials are needed to consider the effect of baggage in the immediate 
vicinity of the explosive device, and of baggage and other barriers between the source 
and sensors. While vibration has the advantage that it is inevitably transmitted to all 
parts of the aircraft, it is ostensibly more difficult to analyse vibration records to locate 
sources. The likelihood of discriminating between explosions and structural failure 
decompressions from vibration records alone is not fully researched and certainly 




We have seen that CVR/CAM records exhibit vibration sensitivity and that 
vibration is transmitted from the seat of an explosion/structural failure to the CAM. 
However, the level of vibration produced in accidents is so high that the dynamic range 
of the CAM/CVR is likely to be exceeded thereby masking the arrival of the explosion 
blast wave or decompression rarefaction wave in the cockpit. 
 
It is appropriate to review all CVR recordings (of established provenance) of known 
explosions and structural failure decompressions.  Such a review could confirm (or 
refute) the assertion that no transition at candidate values of t2 is visible. That is, the 
accident recordings correspond exclusively to vibration and not to pressure/sound. If 
so, accident investigators should be relieved to learn that the inability to obtain useful 
forensic information from the CVR in these cases is not a failing on their part but simply 
an equipment limitation. 
 
The industry needs to consider if explosion/structural failure decompression sensors 
are required. If so, there is a need to invest in research to determine the most suitable 
sensor(s) and appropriate means of recording, possibly exploiting the flexibility now 
available through solid-state recording media. 
 
Preliminary research suggests that pressure-based systems may be ideal in sudden 
catastrophic loss incidents, but trials are needed to consider the effect of baggage and 




This paper has used data from a variety of trials. We gratefully acknowledge the 
support of DSTL (formerly DERA), the Department of Transport (particularly the 




[1]  M M Charles et al., Report on the Accident to Boeing 747-121, N739PA at Lockerbie,  
Dumfiesshire,  Scotland on 21 December 1988, Air Accidents Investigation Branch,  
Department of Transport,  Aircraft Accident Report 2/90,  HMSO,  1990. 
[2]  S J C Dyne and J K Hammond, Identification of the Cause of Failure of Aircraft 
Structures from Cockpit Voice Recorders, Proceedings of the Institute of Acoustics,  
15, Acoustics '93 Part 3 (book 2),  Southampton,  April 1993. 
[3]  M Moshrefi-Torbati and S J C Dyne, Time-frequency Analysis of the CVR's 
Signature, Acoustical and Vibratory Surveillance Methods and Diagnostic 
Techniques, Senlis, France, October 1995. 
[4]  S J C Dyne, Analysis of CVR Transient Signatures, International Society of Air 
Safety Investigators, 28(4), ISASI 95, Seattle, September 1995. 
[5]  F W Slingerland, Vibration Spectrograms for Aircraft Accident Investigation (an 
Overview) , Structural Disaster Diagnosis Canada Inc., Report SDDC/TR/98-002, 
Revision 001, April 1998. 
[6]  F W Slingerland, Development of the CVR Explosion Analysis Technique, An 
Historical Perspective, Structural Disaster Diagnosis Canada Inc., Report 
SDDC/TM/98-003, Revision 001, May 1998. 
[7]  F W Slingerland, Spectrogram Diagnosis of Aircraft Disasters, International Pacific 
Aerospace Conference, Gifu, Japan, 1991. 
[8]  F W Slingerland, Aircraft Damage Analysis by Vibration Spectrograms, Laboratory 
technical report LTR ST 517, National Research Council Canada, 1986. 
[9]  Wayne Jackson (ed.), CVR Explosion Analysis Technique: Development and 
Evaluation, TP 13929E, Transport Canada, May 2002. 
[10]  G F Kinney and K J Graham, Explosive Shocks in Air, Springer-Verlag, 1962. 
[11]  Department of the Army, Fundamentals of Protective Design for Conventional 
Weapons, Technical Manual TM 5-855-1, 1986. 
 